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The Effects of Relative Wages and
Border Enforcement on Illegal Immigration
Aaron Iehl*
ABSTRACT. The flow of illegal immigrants into the United States cannot be accurately
measured because any successful illegal immigrations will not be detected. This paper uses
an apprehensions function developed by Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) to estimate a
lower bound for illegal immigration. An OLS regression model is employed to examine
the effect of relative wages and border enforcement on the number of apprehensions at the
U.S.-Mexico border from 1999-2017. These results are compared with findings from
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) who studied apprehensions from 1976-1995.

I. Introduction
Since the creation of community there has been the concept of a border
– a natural, physical, or social barrier that separates communities from
one another. Some are considered necessary, others unnecessarily
divisive. The southern border of the United States of America has been
an issue for quite some time. In 2016, President Donald Trump
campaigned heavily on the promise of a barrier on the border with
Mexico to address the issue of illegal immigration. He and millions of his
supporters saw this as one of the most important issues of the election
because approximately 11 million Mexican immigrants were living
illegally in the United States in 2015 (Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn 2017).
Two of the most popular forms of addressing illegal immigration are
border enforcement and employer monitoring. While some forms of
employer monitoring are currently in place, border enforcement is the
main method of controlling the flow of immigrants across the U.S-Mexico
border. The proper method of border enforcement is controversial.
Empirical results will help to determine the marginal benefits of a
particular method of enforcement. These findings could either reinforce
current policies or draw them into question and demand a change in the
procedure for border enforcement. Yet simply trying to regulate the flow
*A special thanks to Dr. Bryce Kanago, UNI Professor of Economics, for his assistance
in the model-building process. The extra hours he spent examining this project helped it
to be where it is at today and the project would have been exceedingly more difficult
without his help. It is surely noticed and greatly appreciated!

51

52

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2019

of border crossings falls short of addressing any underlying issue.
What is it that leads millions of immigrants to leave everything
behind and migrate? Numerous studies have pointed to the relative wage
gap between a source country and a destination country as a driving factor
behind these decisions (Butcher and Card 1991; Mishra 2007; Card
2009). But to what extent have relative wages and border enforcement
affected the flow of illegal immigration from the United States to Mexico
since 2000? Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) performed an empirical
analysis measuring illegal immigration via apprehensions from 19761995. My replication of this paper shows that the effect relative wages
have on the decision to migrate has decreased since 2000 compared to the
period from 1976-1995. Enforcement of the border, however, has had an
increased effect on the number of apprehensions at the U.S-Mexico
border.

II. Background Information
According to History.com, the modern U.S.-Mexico Border was
established on December 30, 1853 under President Franklin Pierce. This
settled the dispute over the location of the Mexican border west of El
Paso, Texas and solidified the U.S. southern border.
The country of origin of immigrants flowing into the United States
changed significantly following the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1965. The bill repealed the national-origins quotas used since the 1920s.
Previously, the immigration system was designed to admit mostly
immigrants from Western and Northern European countries. President
Lyndon B. Johnson did not expect this bill to bring about significant
change. The bill, however, did not have the predicted effect in the
succeeding years. There was a large spike in the number of new lawful
permanent residents. “The number of new lawful permanent residents (or
green-card holders) rose from 297,000 in 1965 to an average of about 1
million each year since the mid-2000s” (Chishti, Hipsman, and Ball
2015). The increase in immigrant population exceeded the growth rate
of the population of natives. This is seen in Figure 1 where the share of
the immigrant population has risen from 4.7% in 1970 to 13.5% in 2016.
Not only did the overall number of immigrants rise, but their source
also changed. Lawmakers believed that the new law would encourage
European families to cross the pond and immigrate to the United States.
History shows the opposite happened and European immigration as a
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percentage of total immigration has plummeted from nearly 75% in 1960
to about 15% in 2013 (Chishti, Hipsman, and Ball. 2015). The global
region that displayed the largest uptick in immigrant numbers was Latin
America, specifically Mexico.
Figure 1. Immigrant Share of Total U.S. Population

Source: Migration Policy Institute (MPI) tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau
2010 and 2016 American Community Surveys (ACS), and the 1970-2000 decennial
Census data.

Another controversial immigration bill was the 1986 Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This legislation included the largest
amnesty provision in U.S. history. This pardon for illegal entry into the
United States applied to 2.7 million of the 3.2 million illegal immigrants
living in the U.S. at the time (NumbersUSA.com). The bill itself had a
three-legged approach including “tougher border enforcement, penalties
for employers who hired unauthorized immigrants, and legalization for
unauthorized immigrants who had been in the U.S. for five years or more”
(Chishti, Meissner, and Bergeron 2011). Additionally, IRCA included
an increase in border enforcement, creating a unique testing environment
to measure the marginal product of border enforcement. All indications
pointed to a future that entailed fewer illegal immigrant crossings under
the new programs.
Espenshade (1990, 1995) finds that there was a decline in
apprehensions at the U.S. border in the year after IRCA was implemented,
but there was no lasting effect. Further, IRCA is believed to have had
little or no effect on illegal immigration based upon survey data of
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communities in Mexico (Cornelius 1989; Donato, Durand and Massey
1992). Regardless of the legislation’s effect, IRCA is commonly viewed
as an example of the benefits of the democratic process and how a
functioning government ought to operate.

III. Literature Review
Most research pertaining to the effects of relative wages on immigration
focus on the effect that the immigrants have on a host economy.
However, these studies look at legal, rather than illegal, immigration. For
both legal and illegal immigration, it is understood that wages are the
driving force for a migration decision from Mexico to the United States
(Butcher and Card 1991; Card 2009). The extent to which wages affect
illegal immigration is the question at hand.
The first fence to jump pertains to the impossibility of accurately
measuring illegal border crossings because the number of successful
crossings is unknown. Consequently, an apprehensions function is used
to estimate the number of illegal immigrations. Hanson and Spilimbergo
(1999) developed a very useful apprehension function to estimate a lower
bound for illegal immigration.
They expressed the number of apprehensions at the destinationcountry border as a function of the number of attempts to cross the
border, the relative wage of the United States and Mexico, and the level
of border enforcement. This model used monthly data on total
apprehensions, the number of person hours policing the border, and data
on current and expected U.S. and Mexican wages. Hanson and
Spilimbergo found through an OLS regression that a 10% decrease in the
Mexican real wage leads to a 7.5% to 8.8% increase in apprehensions at
the border. A larger gap in wages between the United States and Mexico
leads to increased immigration.
The 1999 Hanson and Spilimbergo study provided specific results and
took a unique approach to the problem through developing its own
apprehensions function. It provided evidence for the theory suggesting
an increase in the destination country’s wage relative to the source
country’s wage would lead to higher levels of illegal immigration. The
model accounted for 93.7% of the variation in the data. This study
included data collected from December 1976 through August 1995. Now
the data is outdated and new technologies are applied to border
enforcement that were previously unavailable.

Iehl: The Effects of Relative Wages

55

Furthermore, the demographic composition of the United States as the
destination country has changed. The number of immigrants in the
United States born in Mexico has grown from 759,711 in 1970 to
11,796,926 in 2017 (Migration Policy Institute). The change in the
composition of immigrants from mostly Europeans to mostly Latin
Americans can be seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2

It is important to realize the unique nature of immigration from Mexico
to the United States. Many countries see their emigrants going to a
variety of countries. Mexico sees a uniquely high percentage of its
emigrants going to the United States. This allows the model to isolate the
analysis of relative wages to only the two countries of the United States
and Mexico. Geography also plays an important factor in studying
immigration between the United States and Mexico specifically. When
it comes to the decision to migrate, distance matters (Clark, Hatton, and
Williamson 2002). If the distance to migrate increases, then the
associated costs will increase as well. With a large land border between
the countries, it means that many immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico
border will be from Mexico due to the costs associated with migration.
The typical immigrant has changed. Today, it is most likely that an
immigrant coming to the U.S. is from Latin America. As previously
mentioned, the best available measure of illegal immigration is the
number of apprehensions. Inevitably, there will be some successful
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illegal attempts to cross the border. This means that the number of
apprehensions is an underestimate of total illegal immigration. When
changes in apprehensions are observed, it is a mistake to automatically
assume that the flow of illegal immigrants is changing in the same way.
Apprehensions by the U.S. border patrol are positively correlated with
U.S. expenditure on border enforcement and the current U.S. real wage
(Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1991). Where there are greater human,
physical, and technological resources available to apprehend illegal
immigrants crossing the border, the marginal product of these resources
is positive.
Lessem (2017) studied the locations of illegal immigrant crossings.
Prior to 1995, 63% of illegal immigrants at the southern border crossed
at San Diego. Stronger border enforcement was implemented in 1995 and
the percentage of crossings at the San Diego border location fell to 31%.
The number of illegal immigrant crossings in other areas increased at the
same time. This implies that enforcement may alter where the crossings
occur but may not affect the overall number if areas of the border have
varying levels of security.
Apprehensions as measured for this study only track the occurrences.
They do not take into account the particular individual, or individuals,
apprehended and how many times they have previously been
apprehended. Espenshade (1995) finds that immigrants will continue
trying to immigrate until they succeed. This is largely because the fixed
costs of immigration are a sunk cost at this point. Often times the most
expensive part of immigrating is getting to the border itself prior to
attempting to cross. Once at the border, it is relatively inexpensive to
cross the border with a very low cost to getting apprehended as current
policy is simply to be sent back across the border into Mexico.

IV. Model
The model for this paper will follow the ordinary least squares (OLS)
model used in the Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) paper, but with some
adjustments.
ln APPt  0  1lnH t  2 lnH t 1  3 lnWt  4 lnWt 1  5 Recession 



n
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The current replication study uses a log-log model where APP is the
number of apprehensions made by the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP) at the US-Mexico border. The U.S CBP refers to the U.S.-Mexico
land border simply as the “Southwest Sector” since they patrol all border
areas of the U.S. The apprehensions made at the U.S.-Mexico border is
the measured response variable of the model.
Next the model includes both current enforcement hours (H) and
lagged values of enforcement hours. These are the hours spent by
employees of the U.S. Border Patrol enforcing the Southwest portion of
the border. Looking specifically at this sector of the border ensures that
the apprehensions value does not look at apprehensions made at other
sector’s border checkpoints or in the interior of the United States. The
previously discussed migration displacement effect in (Lessem 2017)
does not apply here. Both the additional enforcement hours and recorded
apprehensions are for the entire U.S-Mexico land border. If migration
were to be displaced it would be picked up in the U.S. CBP’s statistics in
another border sector. However, most illegal immigrants will be unlikely
have the resources to attempt crossing at a different border sectors (i.e.
Florida, Canada, or other coastal points) due to the large costs necessary
for the attempts.
Lagged values of enforcement hours are included to examine whether
the apprehensions made in the previous month have any effect on the
number of apprehensions for the next month. If there is such an effect,
it implies that the border enforcement is an effective deterrent to illegal
immigration. While hours (H) and its lag are anticipated to be collinear,
both are still included in the model since economic theory suggests they
measure different effects. Economic significance along with statistical
significance must be taken into account when selecting the model.
The model uses a relative wage variable (Wage), but the variable is
comprised of two other measures. The first is the U.S. wage. The U.S.
wage used by Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) is what a prospective
migrant who successfully crosses the U.S.-Mexico border would expect
to make. The original model takes a weighted average of seven industries
that a successful illegal immigrant is likely to enter. This includes
construction, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade,
finance/insurance/real estate, and services. However, for simplicity,
manufacturing wages are the only wages used in the replicating study.
Second is the Mexican wage for prospective migrants. Hanson and
Spilimbergo (1999) make the assumption that manufacturing wages are
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the relevant local wage for those who will likely migrate across the
border. The Mexican wage is only found in an indexed format with all
wages relating to the 2015 wage, which is set as 100. Thus, it will appear
that the Mexican wage exceeds the U.S. wage because U.S. wages are in
dollars whereas the Mexican wages are an index number centered on 100.
Further discussion of the interpretation of the U.S.-Mexico real relative
wage relating to apprehensions will be found in the results section of the
paper.
In order to compare the wages across time and countries, some
adjustments to the wages need to be made. The U.S. wage and the
Mexican wage both must be deflated by the U.S. Consumer Price Index
(CPI) and the Mexican CPI, respectively. This places the wages in real
terms. The real relative wage is then taken from dividing the real U.S.
dollar wage by the real index of Mexican wages. The final transformation,
to ensure homoscedasticity, is to take the natural log of the real relative
wage. In the model, the current real relative wage (W) is included to see
if the current month’s wages influence the flow of migration. The
previous month’s real relative wage is also included to determine if the
wages in the past influence the current migration decisions.
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) also consider the effects of economic
volatility in their model. Through examining lagged periods of a peso
devaluation, they were able to associate apprehensions with the presence
of economic volatility. A positive link between economic volatility and
migration is also established by Jerome (1926). The work of Hanson and
Spilimbergo (1999) supports Jerome’s work and they found that a 6.5%
to 8.2% increase in border apprehensions is associated with a devaluation
in the peso during the previous month. While their model looked at
economic volatility in this way, the replication model used did not include
the peso exchange rate being devalued as it is simply another measure of
the economy already seen in examining the relative wages.
Lagged apprehensions are included to account for return migration.
Since the large cost of migration is sunk and deportation policy is to drop
apprehended immigrants off not far from the border, apprehended
immigrants are likely to attempt to cross the border illegally again. There
is growing theoretical, empirical, and anecdotal evidence suggesting that
undocumented migrants who attempt to enter the United States across the
U.S.-Mexico border will persevere in their efforts. No matter how many
times they are apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol, they will continue
crossing the border until they eventually succeed (Calavita et. al, 1992).
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For the same reason, the lagged value of apprehensions at the interior is
included in the original model. Illegal immigrants deported from the
interior are also likely to attempt to re-enter the United States relatively
quickly. The recent interior apprehensions (apprehension of illegal
immigrants made within the United States) are unavailable and thus the
lagged interior apprehensions will not be included in the model.
One addition to the model is a dummy variable accounting for a
United States economic recession. This is included to see if the downturn
in the American economy has any statistically significant impact on the
flow of migrants to the United States. Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) did
not include this variable. It is expected that the variable would decrease
apprehensions as there will be a less promising economic outlook for the
immigrants looking to migrate the United States. This would in theory
lead to a lower level of apprehensions during a recession. Dummy
variables for the month and a time trend are also included, along with a
random error term.
Predictions regarding the signs of the coefficients are laid out below
in Table A. It is believed that enforcement hours (H) will have a positive
coefficient as numerous studies, including Hanson and Spilimbergo
(1999), have found a positive marginal product of enforcement. Nothing
has changed that would lead one to expect that additional enforcement
would reduce the number of apprehensions. However, the lagged
enforcement hours are expected to have a negative coefficient due to the
presence of a deterrent effect. In addition, the current relative wage (W)
and lagged relative wages also would be expected to have a positive
coefficient, leading to increased apprehensions. The relative U.S.-Mexico
wage could increase due to the U.S. wage increasing, the Mexican wage
decreasing, or a combination of the two.
Immigrants who are previously apprehended and deported are very
likely to repeat migrate. This would lead to predicting that lagged
apprehensions would have a positive coefficient as there would be an
increase in the supply of immigrants seeking to migrate. Hanson and
Spilimbergo (1999) agree with all of these findings, but further analysis
will need to be done to see if this holds true for the updated data,
including years since 1999.
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TABLE A
Description

Expected
Sign

SW U.S. Border Apprehensions by U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol of individuals attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border
illegally. (Dependent Variable)

N/A

Enforcement
Hours

U.S. Customs and Border Patrol person hours spent enforcing the
U.S.-Mexico border

+

Enforcement
Hours Lag

U.S. Customs and Border Patrol person hours spent enforcing the
U.S.-Mexico border during the previous period.

_

Real Relative
Wage

[Real U.S. Dollar Wage in Manufacturing/U.S. CPI]
[Real Indexed Mexican Wage in Manufacturing/Mexican CPI]

+

Variable
Apprehensions

Real Relative
Wage Lag

The Real Relative Wage as calculated above from the previous
period.

+

Apprehensions
Lag

Apprehensions made by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol during
the previous month of individuals attempting to cross the U.S.Mexico border illegally.

+

Recession

Dummy variable to indicate the presence of a recession in the
United States economy during a particular month.

_

Trend

The apprehensions display a downward trend over the series, so
including a term with a negative expected sign makes sense.

Month

Monthly dummy variables are included to account for the
seasonal nature of apprehensions. Signs per month are difficult
to predict, but in general apprehensions are expected to be higher
in summer months when more seasonal jobs are available for
immigrants.

_

Varying

V. Data
The data collected are from multiple sources but are from 1999 through
2017. All values are monthly. The dependent variable is the number of
border apprehensions. This is the monthly value of all apprehensions
occurring at the U.S.-Mexico border. The source of this data in the
original Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) paper was the Immigration and
Naturalization Services; the agency shut down in 2003. The new agency
taking many of the Immigration and Naturalization Services’
responsibilities is the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol which falls under
the Department of Homeland Security. The U.S. Customs and Border
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Patrol stores publicly available statistics. The updated apprehension
measures for the Southwest sector were found there. Interior
apprehensions are also examined in the original study, but not in this
replication due to the lack of availability of the interior apprehensions.
The enforcement hours of the agents enforcing the border were also
previously gathered from the Immigrations and Naturalization Services,
but with its closing, the statistics are no longer available. The U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol does not have the monthly totals of
enforcement hours at the U.S.-Mexico border. Dr. Gordon H. Hanson,
who worked on the original paper, was able to provide updated values of
enforcement hours through 2008. This is not as recent as desired, but
under some manipulation and set assumptions, the measures can be
extrapolated out to 2018. The number of staff members enforcing the
border are available for each year. The model assumes that each staff
member works the same number of hours and that the number of
enforcement hours is non-seasonal; Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) show
that the enforcement hours are not a seasonal variable. Each month’s
number of enforcement hours is that year’s number of border patrol
employees multiplied by the standard number of hours for a typical U.S.Mexico Border Patrol employee.
The relative wage between the United States and Mexico is a created
variable. The United States wage in the original study was the weighted
average of seven non-agricultural industries given by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics. For the current replication study, only manufacturing
wages are used for both the U.S. and Mexico. Construction wages were
considered for the study, but data was not found in as clean of condition
as the manufacturing wages were. Therefore, the best available wage
measure was selected. The nominal U.S. manufacturing wages1 and the
nominal indexed Mexican manufacturing wages2 are found in the Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database. The U.S. CPI3 and Mexico
CPI4 are used to put these terms into real measures and are also found
from FRED.
As previously pointed out, the most glaring limitation to the data is
the fact that actual illegal immigration is not measurable. The entire
study can only provide a lower bound for illegal immigration. The
apprehension function would only predict the total number of illegal
immigrations accurately only if there were zero successful illegal
immigrant crossings, which is an unreasonable assumption. The error
term of how great the under approximation is also unknown due to the
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nature of the response variable. Another limitation is the lack of
availability of the all desired data. The model could lack some precision
due to the simplifying assumptions made because of data limitations.
These are necessary due to the unavailability of the data otherwise, and
model accuracy should be considered accordingly.

VI. Results
The data from 1999-2017 were used to calculate the regression results for
the equation described earlier. All values used in this model were in their
log form. A collection of all regression results is included in the following
Table B.
The adjusted r-squared correlation coefficient for the model shows
that the model accounts for 93.25% of the variation in the data. The first
coefficient is the enforcement hours (H). The log of the enforcement
hours was found to be strongly significant predictor of the number of
apprehensions. The corresponding p-value to the log of enforcement
hours is less than 0.001 as seen in Table B. Since the values are in log
forms, their interpretation is in percentage increases rather than unit
levels. For a 10% increase in enforcement hours, apprehensions would
be expected to rise by 33.53%. This is greater than the original study by
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) which found a 10% increase in
enforcement hours to increase apprehensions by 7.57%. Both studies
show that increasing enforcement increases apprehensions. Therefore, a
positive marginal product of enforcement exists. This is expected
because as more resources are devoted to the border, a higher proportion
of immigrants will be apprehended. This increase in the coefficient could
mean that enforcement has become more efficient. This could be due to
better personnel, training, equipment, etc. These findings offer support
for current U.S CBP enforcement policies. This would mean more of a
focus should be placed on building up the enforcement of the border
rather than monitoring the employers where these illegal immigrants may
look to find work.
In contrast to the positive marginal product of enforcement hours, the
lagged enforcement hours are seen to have a negative effect, as expected.
A 10% increase in lagged enforcement hours would lead to a 34.17%
decrease in apprehensions. The lagged enforcement hours are very
strongly statistically significant as seen in the p-value being less than
0.001. Again, this is of much greater magnitude than the original Hanson
and Spilimbergo (1999) study which showed a 3.00% decrease in
apprehensions.
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TABLE B
Variable

Expected

Actual Coefficient

Standard

P-Value

Sign

Intercept

+

+

1.705

1.149

0.139

Enforcement Hours

+

+

3.353

0.578

2.40e-8

***

–

–

-3.417

0.573

1.06e-8

***

+

+

0.217

0.963

0.821

+

–

-0.310

0.980

0.752

Apprehensions Lag

+

+

0.875

0.036

2.0e-16

***

Recession

–

+

0.061

0.036

0.092

*

Trend

–

–

-.009

0.006

0.093

*

M2

N/A

–

-0.056

0.052

0.258

M3

N/A

+

0.243

0.052

5.23e-6

***

0.052

-5

***

-9

Enforcement Hours
Lag
Real Relative Wage
Real Relative Wage
Lag

M4

N/A

+

Deviation

Statistical

Sign

0.217

Significance

4.04e

M5

N/A

+

0.321

0.052

3.33e

***

M6

N/A

+

0.181

0.053

0.0007

***

M7

N/A

+

0.105

0.053

0.051

*

M8

N/A

+

0.223

0.053

4.51e-5

***

M9

N/A

+

0.118

0.054

0.028

*

M10

N/A

+

0.221

0.054

-5

***

-5

5.83e

M11

N/A

+

0.234

0.056

3.89e

***

M12

N/A

–

-0.179

0.057

0.002

**

*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level.

This large increase provides evidence of a strong deterrent effect
associated with enforcement. If there is a greater presence of
enforcement at the border, more people may become unwilling to migrate
due to the greater likelihood that they would be apprehended while
crossing the border.
When describing the model, it was expected that the current and
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lagged enforcement hours may be collinear. This thought was confirmed
because both have a variance inflation factor (VIF) greater than 10. Any
number above this threshold implies that the variable is collinear with
another variable or variables. However, due to the differing theoretical
measures that they provide, and the strong statistical significance, they are
important variables to keep in the model.
The next results with the model involve the relative wage between the
United States and Mexico. The U.S.-Mexico relative wage calculated
uses Mexican wages that are based on an index. If the actual Mexican
wages were available a much more straightforward interpretation of the
relative wage measure would exist. All analysis of the relative wages
needs to be in regard to the change in the real U.S. dollar wage divided by
the real index of Mexican wages. The real U.S. dollar wage divided by
the real index of Mexican wages will be referred to as the “U.S.-Mexico
Relative Wage” for the remainder of this paper.
The original Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) paper has actual wages
for the United States and Mexico, thus it makes comparing coefficients
between the results for this paper and the original paper impossible. The
original paper found that a 10% increase in their wage measure lead to a
5.28% increase in apprehensions. This empirical study showed that a
10% increase in the U.S-Mexico Relative Wage leads to a 2.17% increase
in apprehensions. However, this is not a statistically significant
coefficient as the p-value is 0.821. This means there is reasonable odds
that this coefficient could be found by chance, and thus this variable does
not add value to the model statistically speaking. The lag of the U.S.Mexico Relative Wage is also included in the model to see if economic
shocks have a delayed response in the number of apprehensions. This
also was not statistically significant with a large p-value of 0.752. If the
model were to be based purely on statistical means, the U.S.-Mexico
Relative Wage and its lag would be removed from the model. However,
due to the economic theory linking wages to migration (Butcher and Card
1991), I kept it in the model.
I also tested to see if the U.S.-Mexico Relative Wage and its lag were
collinear, and the empirical results suggest that they are not collinear.
They have VIFs that are less than the common threshold of 10. Economic
changes can have their effect distributed over a period of time which is
why inclusion of the lag could be helpful. Future models could consider
including more lags to see if that would yield additional statistical
significance.
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The next variable in the model was looking at the lag of border
apprehensions. The original Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) study found
that a 10% increase in lagged apprehension increases current
apprehensions by 5.75%. This paper found that a 10% increase in lagged
apprehension leads to an 8.75% increase in current apprehensions. This
is a strongly statistically significant result with a p-value of significantly
less than 0.001. This shows a potential flaw in the current deportation
policy. With apprehended immigrants dropped off not far on the other
side of the border, they are very likely to repeat migrate. As the
replication study shows, immigrants are more likely to repeat migrate, and
thus get apprehended again than they were during the original study. This
is an area where changes in policy could really change the amounts of
immigrants who repeatedly attempt to migrate with essentially no
incentives against doing so.
Figure 3.

U.S. Border Patrol Monthly Apprehensions (FY 2018-2018). U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
2019. https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-total-monthlyapps-sector-area-fy2018.pdf

In looking at Figure 3, it is clear that there has been a significant
change in the overall level of apprehensions, and thus immigration since
1999. To account for the change, a trend term was included in the model
and was found to be statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Since
the level of apprehensions has decreased, it makes sense that
apprehensions are decreasing by 0.009% with the trend.
Since there is this great downward trend in apprehensions (Figure 3),
and the U.S.-Mexico Relative Wage measure are insignificant, a break in
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the data could be useful in constructing better models. This was not done
for this study but is an extension that could be helpful. As a suggestion,
it may be helpful to examine the data separately before and after 2010 due
to the higher levels and volatility of apprehensions displayed prior to this
point.
To attempt to better explain the number of apprehensions of
immigrants, an additional dummy was added to the model to indicate a
recession.
The results show that a recession actually causes
apprehensions to increase at the U.S-Mexico border. This is a statistically
significant variable with a p-value of 0.092. The positive sign of the
coefficient is opposite of what was predicted prior to running this model.
However, the positive coefficient could be explained because a recession
in the United States could have an even stronger economic impact on
adjacent countries such as Mexico. This gives greater incentive to
migrate as the economic prospects are potentially more promising in the
United States. The statistical significance of recessions also gives support
for adding a break in the data as there has not been a recession in the
United States since 2009. This is an example of a significant dummy
variable, and there are many other dummy variables that could add value
to the model that could be added as an extension to the model in another
trial. Table B also shows the results for the included trend and monthly
dummy variables.
Overall, it is difficult to measure the impact of wages on
apprehensions since they are not statistically significant. However, from
the given coefficients, it shows that the effect of relative wages on
apprehensions are less than they were during the original study. Hanson
and Spilimbergo (1999) found that a 10% increase in their real wage led
to a 7.5% to 8.8% increase in apprehensions. This paper shows that a
10% increase in the U.S. Mexico Relative Wage leads to approximately
a 2.17% increase in apprehensions, so the results show that the effect of
wages has decreased since 2000 compared to results presented over the
years 1976-1995. The enforcement hours of the U.S.-Mexico border now
have a much greater marginal product of enforcement. At the same time,
this has also raised the deterrent effect as seen through apprehensions
decreasing significantly with the lag of enforcement hours. However,
there could be other contributing factors to declining immigration other
than the deterrent effect that are not explained by the model. The
replication model has a respectable adjusted r-squared of 0.9325, but
there are certainly areas to improve the model that could be carried on in
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extensions.

VII. Conclusion
Results found in an empirical study published over 20 years ago ought to
be reexamined, as this paper does. For the sake of policy decisions, labor
markets, and enforcement procedures, it is necessary to know the extent
to which relative wages and border enforcement affect the flow of illegal
immigration from Mexico to the United States. Over the last 20 years,
evidence suggests that the effect of relative wages on illegal immigration
has decreased. However, the evidence also points to a greater marginal
product of enforcement.
These results can help to predict the flow of illegal immigrants and
can be used to determine the marginal product of border enforcement as
a policy to control the border. Knowing what aspects of the immigration
discussion have statistical significance are important for making decisions
that affect the lives of real people. This study demonstrates the value of
replicating studies over different periods of time in order to help focus
discussions on certain areas with an empirical framework. Empirical
analysis such as the Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) study alongside of
this replication study seek to provide means to better understand
immigrant flows.
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